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1. The Framework of Comparison 
The occupation of Iraq by the coalition forces led by the United States was 
originally said to be undertaken in order to prevent Iraq from developing 
WMD.  But, as WMD and their production facilities were not found, the 
occupation is now justified as an attempt at changing Iraq from a rogue state 
into a democratic and peaceful country.  President Bush had already 
referred in his pre-war address to Germany and Japan as models for 
producing democratic allies through occupation(1).  However, there are 
reports (e.g., Pei & Kasper) that suggest that Germany and Japan are 
exceptions, as most other U.S. attempts at democratization through 
occupation have failed.  In fact, Iraq under occupation for more than three 
years is now in a state of near civil war and it is difficult to claim that is 
becoming a stable democracy.  It is still premature to conclude the 
occupation of Iraq is a complete failure, but its difference from the German 
and Japanese cases is already clear.  Space doesn’t allow me to discuss the 
Japanese case in detail, not to mention the German one, but I would like to 
explore the differences between Iraq and Japan and to trace their causes. In 
particular, I wish to find out whether the causes are national character 
(political, social, and cultural), or the war itself, or occupation policies and 
their implementation, or all of the above.  
     As a framework of comparison, I would like to employ Samuel P. 
Huntington’s theses on democratization presented in his “The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 
1991).  There are many more studies on democratization(2), but I find 
Huntington’s comparatively newer, more comprehensive, and its framework 
the most appropriate to the research purpose of this study.  First of all, he 
defines democracy as follows: 
 
     Following in the Schumpeterian tradition, this study defines a twentieth-century 
political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision 
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makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates 
freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to 
vote.  So defined, democracy involves the two dimensions — contestation and 
participation — that Robert Dahl saw as critical to his realistic democracy or 
polyarchy.  It also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, 
publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the 
conduct of electoral campaigns. (p.7) 
 
     It is without doubt that since the occupation ended in 1952 Japan has 
maintained a political system that fits to this definition of democracy, but 
Iraq is, after formally restoring sovereignty in mid-2004, still dependent on 
the coalition forces for security and finding it difficult to conduct free 
elections with civil and political freedoms, as candidates are afraid of 
campaigning for fear of losing their lives. 
     In order for democratization to succeed, it is necessary to promptly fill 
the vacuum of authority when an authoritarian system collapses.  
According to Huntington, “This can be done by: pushing to the fore a popular, 
charismatic, democratically inclined leader; promptly organizing elections to 
provide popular legitimacy to a new government; and building international 
legitimacy by getting support of foreign and transnational actors.”(p.151)  
As a new democracy becomes consolidated and achieves a certain stability, it 
would have to tackle “systemic problems” such as: “overly concentrated 
decision making, deficient feedback, dependence on performance legitimacy,” 
and “stalemate, the inability to reach decisions, susceptibility to 
demagoguery, domination by vested economic interests.”(p.210)  
Huntington also presents “guidelines for democratizers” in dealing with 
authoritarian crimes (e.g., don’t indict perpetrators except the leaders and 
high officials) and curbing military power and promoting military 
professionalism.(chap.5) 
     Whether a new democracy succeeds in solving these problems or not 
depends on the following, according to Huntington: 
(1) The ability of the principal political elites to work together … and 
refrain from exploiting those problems for their own immediate 
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material or political advantage. 
(2)  The ability of publics to distinguish between the regime and the 
government or rulers. …Democracies become consolidated when 
people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, 
but not necessary to anything else.(pp.259-263) 
     Then, when can we expect such abilities of the principal political elites 
and also publics?  Huntington’s hypotheses are: 
(1) When there is a longer and more recent experience with democracy. 
(2) If the state has a more industrialized, modern economy, the more 
complex society and more educated populace. 
(3) When there is an external environment supportive of democracy -- 
foreign governments and other actors that are democratic 
themselves and can help or influence other states’ democratic 
regimes. 
(4)  The prevalence of indigenous causes is likely to be more conducive 
to democratic consolidation than are external influences. 
(5) A consensual, less violent transition provides a better basis for 
consolidating democracy than do conflict and violence. 
(6) The number and nature of severe contextual problems a new 
democracy confronts may be one variable.  
(7) Nations may differ in their political capacities and that a people 
who made a success of authoritarianism will do the same with 
democracy.(pp.270-279) 
If I may sum up Huntington’s above arguments on transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy in the late 20th century, the following factors 
seem to be important for its success --  
Internal factors: whether or not political elites strongly support 
democracy and can cooperate with each other to solve social problems; the 
ordinary people have a tradition of civil society activities; and the level of 
social and economic development is sufficiently high. 
External factors:  whether or not other democratic countries can help 
and influence; or neighboring states give “snowballing effects” with their 
democratization. 
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Transition policies: establishment of a legitimate government through 
elections; and dealings with authoritarian crimes, the military, and vested 
economic interests, etc.. 
Although the cases of Iraq and Japan are different from the cases 
Huntington discussed in that they were forced democratization by occupying 
powers, I am going to compare the two with above hypotheses in mind, with 
additional factors of war and occupation(3).  Therefore, I will start with 
pre-war political, social, and economic conditions (Both Iraq and Japan had 
been engaged with many wars, but here the wars that led to occupation are 
taken up). 
    
2. Pre-War Conditions 
2-1-1 Iraqi Historical and Social Background 
Baghdad prospered as the capital of the Abbasid Dynasty between the 8th 
and 13th centuries, but was later under Mongolian and then Turkish 
domination and was the core city of Baghdad Province.  The area was 
occupied by the British army in 1917 and constituted, together with Mosul 
and Basra Provinces, a territory named Iraq which was mandated to Britain 
by the League of Nations in 1920.  In an uprising to protest the British rule, 
Iraqis and British as well as Indian soldiers estimated at six thousands and 
five hundreds each perished (Tripp, p.44), and Turkey intervened claiming 
its right to own Mosul.  In the following year Faisal of Mecca’s Hashimi 
family was enthroned as King, and Iraq obtained independence in 1932. 
     So, Iraq was an artificial state created by Britain and the League of 
Nations, and its history extends to only 86 years.  Besides, the original 
three Ottoman provinces are rather different from each other – the 
predominant inhabitants are Sunni Kurds in Mosul, Sunni Arabs in 
Baghdad, and Shiite Arabs in Basra – and it has not been easy for them to 
have a sense of one nation.  The constitution of 1924 formalized a 
constitutional monarchy with King’s wide-ranging power over a bi-cameral 
Parliament.  The Upper House members were appointed by the King, the 
Lower House members indirectly elected, and the King appointed the 
Cabinet, which was however made responsible for the Lower House.  Sunni 
4 
Arabs were a minority, but because Ottomans as well as the King were 
Sunnis, they came to dominate the government and army.  The Iraqi 
economy was shaken by the world economic crisis in the 1930s, but with 
concession fees paid by the Iraqi Oil Company and oil exports from Kirkuk, 
the financial base of the government became solid. 
     After independence, the government promoted centralization through 
suppression of revolts by Shiite tribes, and the army came to interfere in 
politics.  Pan-Arabism gained influence among political elites, but during 
World War II they split into a pro-British camp and a pro-Axis camp.  In 
1941 the pro-Axis camp seized power with a coup-d’Etat, but British troops 
occupied Iraq and supported a pro-British regime led by Regent Abd al-Ilah 
and Nuri al-Said.  After the war, political parties generally enjoyed freedom 
and in 1954 elections opposition parties gained considerable seats of the 
Lower House.  Then King Faisal II and Regent Abd al-Ilah ordered Nuri 
al-Said to lead a cabinet and dissolve the Lower House, repressing the 
opposition parties.  Moreover, the government concluded an alliance treaty 
with Britain and Turkey (the Baghdad Pact of 1955) angering young 
Pan-Arabist officers.  In 1956, Egypt obtained a major political victory over 
Britain and France in the Suez War, and further stirred up Pan-Arabism by 
announcing establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Syria in 
February 1958, triggering a military coup-d’Etat in Iraq in July, which ended 
the dynasty and democratic experiments (Tripp, chaps.2-4; Marr, chaps.3-4; 
Dawisha). 
     The revolutionary government led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim 
however didn’t unify Iraq with the UAR, and tried to unify Shiites and Kurds 
with Sunni Arabs.  Pan-Arabists were therefore angry, and so Ba’thists and 
allied officers staged another coup and killed Qasim in 1963.  In the ensuing 
struggle for power among Ba’thists, Nasserists,  Communists, and tribes, 
Abd al-Salam Arif, a former ally of Qasim, became victorious and produced a 
new constitution in1964, which stressed the aim of Arab unification.  His 
government agreed with Egypt over future Iraqi unification and introduced 
political as well as economic reforms after the Egyptian model including land 
reforms, nationalization of big companies, and the merger of political parties.  
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Eventually, however, Arif also inclined toward an Iraq-first policy rather 
than Arab unification, and repressed the Ba’thists.  In 1968, Ba’thists and 
allied officers again resorted to a coup, by which Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr 
became President and Saddam Husain (Hussein), Deputy-Secretary of 
Regional (that is, Iraqi) Command of the Ba’th Party.  But this regime 
pursued unification of Iraq by Sunni Arabs (rather than Arab unification), 
and imposed violent control on Shiites and Kurds.  On the other hand, Bakr 
and Husain rewarded Sunni loyalists with land and concessions, and 
strengthened their rule with now abundant oil money in the 1970s. 
     In 1974, Kurds began an independence movement aided by Iran, and 
Baghdad tried to suppress it, but in the next year made an Algier Agreement 
with Iran in which Iran promised to stop aiding Kurds in exchange for an 
Iraqi concession of territory.  When Egypt began to negotiate peace with 
Israel, Iraq convened an Arab summit in Baghdad in 1978 and tried to grab 
Arab leadership from the hands of the Egyptians.  The following year saw 
an Islamic revolution in Iran, and in Iraq Husain took over from Bakr, 
became President, and began to purge rivals.  As Husain’s power base was 
consolidated with loyalists from his home town (Tikrit), he began war with 
Iran in 1980 to restore territory and eliminate the threat of a Shiite 
revolution spreading to Iraq. In 1982, Iran succeeded in its counter-attack, 
and the Husain regime was only saved by Soviet and French weapons made 
available with massive financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  
In fact, since 1984 Husain used chemical weapons both against Iranian 
soldiers and rebellious Kurds.  Iran gave up its aim of achieving victory and 
agreed to truce in 1988.  The eight –year war with Iran cost Iraq 200-250 
thousand lives, including those of the repressed Kurds (Tripp, p.248; Marr,  
pp.207-208).   
 
2-1-2. Iraq’s Pre-War Political Conditions  
Husain had to placate the people angry over the failed war by restoring 
economy, but his government was handicapped by a huge amount of 
war-related debts and a decrease of oil-export income owing to low prices.  
So, Baghdad tried to persuade other OPEC members to control oil production 
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in order to raise the price, and also requested Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to 
exempt 40 billion dollars in debts and to aid in Iraqi reconstruction.  Having 
failed in both, Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared its annexation in 1990, 
taking hold of its territory and wealth.  As is well-known, Iraq was 
condemned by both the United Nations and the Arab League, was imposed 
economic sanctions, and in the next year it was attacked and forced to 
withdraw from Kuwait by the multi-national forces led by the United States 
and Britain, which included troops from many Arab countries as well.  Iraq 
was defeated in only 44 days after the onset of land war, and consented to 
accept UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament) 
inspection teams, as well as other demands in UN Security Council 
resolutions.  As the humiliating defeat weakened the Husain regime, 
Shiites and Kurds rose in mass revolts, but the remaining elite “Republican 
Guard” units loyal to Husain easily suppressed them, killing tens of 
thousands and driving millions into refuge within and beyond borders (Marr, 
pp.251-252). 
     Multi-national forces refrained from intervention fearing the breakup 
of Iraq and possible regional conflicts, but the Security Council had to forbid 
Iraqi planes to fly over a northern (Kurdish) zone to stop the massacre (later, 
a southern, Shiite zone was added).  Soon UNSCOM and the IAEA teams 
entered Iraq and tried to find and destroy WMD and their production 
facilities, against Iraqi attempts at obstruction. The Iraqi government first 
resisted but accepted in 1996 a Security Council resolution which set up an 
“oil for food” scheme.  Iraq was allowed to export oil up to 2 billion dollars a 
year to pay for Kuwaiti reparations and import of foods and medicine, the 
amount to be raised later to 5.5 and then 8.3 billion dollars.  Iraq objected to 
continuation of UN inspections, obstructed them, was bombed by U.S. and 
British air forces, and expelled inspectors in 1998. 
     The plight of the masses caused by economic sanctions, and the blow to 
the government’s prestige by military sanctions didn’t after all bring about 
the fall of Husain regime. It survived because about 500 thousand loyalists, 
mostly Sunni Arabs especially from Tikrit, who were treated with privileges 
kept watch over the other twenty million people, suppressing any – actual or 
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presumed – opposition movements very harshly (Tripp, pp.264-271; 
Anderson & Stansfield, pp.101-109).  Shiites were thus systematically 
repressed, but Kurds in the northern no-fly zone enjoyed relative autonomy 
and set up their regional assembly and government in 1992 (Anderson & 
Stansfield, pp.172-178).  Iraq’s émigré oppositionists and Kurdish 
representatives formed the Iraq National Congress (INC) and occasionally 
met in the Kurdish region, but they couldn’t overcome their disagreements.  
Another émigré opposition group, made of mostly Sunni Arabs, named itself 
Iraq National Accord (INA) and organized coup-d’Etat attempts from Jordan, 
but never succeeded.  The U.S. Congress adopted an “Iraq Liberation Act” 
in 1998, which pledged to aid such recognized Iraqi opposition groups with 
100 million dollars in total.   
 
2-1-3. Iraq’s Pre-War Economic Conditions 
There is scanty data available on the Iraqi economy after the Gulf War, and 
in pre-war 1987, the agricultural population amounted to 13%, mining and 
manufacturing 18%, services 53%, etc. (Marr, p.311).  Iraq’s GNP was 38 
billion dollars and 2,160 dollars per capita in 1989, which dropped to 17 
billion dollars and 907 dollars per capita in 1992 because of the war and 
economic sanctions (The Middle East, p.274).  The literacy rate was 
estimated at 57% in 2001 (Marr, p.295).  As the oil-for-food deal was 
expanded, in 2001-2002 Iraq produced 2.8 million barrels of oil per day, 
exported 1.7 million, and obtained 12 billion dollars.  After deduction of 
Kuwaiti reparations, UN operation expenses, and 13% sharing to the 
Kurdish region, the Iraq Government received about 50%.  Then, Iraq’s 
GNP per capita was estimated at above 1,000 dollars (Tripp, p.278; Marr, 
p.294).  Without previous wars with Iran and Kuwait (as well as 
multi-national forces), and with an enormous amount of possible revenues 
from oil export, Iraq would have been a prosperous nation by then, but as it 
was in pre-war days, most people were in dire economic and social conditions, 




2-2. Comparison with Japan 
In historical and social background, Japan is entirely different from Iraq as 
it formed a state as early as the 5th century, and except for the colonies it held 
briefly between the late 19th and mid-20th centuries, it has been a very 
homogeneous nation (even today, most Japanese speak only Japanese and 
are Buddhist-Shintoist).  In democratic experiences, too, it differs from Iraq 
considerably, as it adopted a constitution in 1889 and had governments 
composed mostly by elected members of Parliament between 1890 and 
around 1932, which was longer and in the more recent past than that of Iraq 
between 1924 and 1958.  The militarist and semi-totalitarian regime 
between 1932 and 1945 apparently resembles that of Iraq between 1980 and 
2003, but in mainland Japan (that is, excluding the colonies), a social order 
based on nationalistic unity was maintained, which differed qualitatively 
from the fragile social order in Iraq distinguished by terror with occasional 
revolts.  Economically, Japan started its industrial revolution in the 1890s, 
and with a quarter of the working population employed in manufacturing in 
1940, it was capable of producing some of the best fighter airplanes and 
warships during World War II, whereas the Iraqi economy has remained 
dependent on oil export.  So, Japan, with well educated populace, had 
developed by the war relatively modern and efficient administrative as well 
as economic systems which enabled it to keep fighting with the U.S. more 
than three and a half years.  By contrast, the  Iraqi government and 
economy before the war were on the verge of collapse, which resulted in 
military defeat in only 40 days.  In sum, in terms of its political and 
economic development, Japan was much more ready for transition to 
democracy than Iraq was.  
    
3. War 
3-1. Iraq 
In 2001 the new Bush administration demanded Iraq to accept the UN 
inspection teams again, and as tightening the UN sanction was opposed by 
Russia and other Arab states, it may have started thinking about invading 
Iraq.  After the September 11 attacks, Husain’s public comment to the effect 
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that the U.S. asked for them angered Americans and made them think Iraq 
was united with al-Qaida.  Therefore, when the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan was defeated in about 40 days with minimum American 
casualties, Washington wanted to use the mobilized troops to topple Husain 
regime, too (Woodward, chaps. 5 & 9; Zunes, pp.21-30).  With this military 
pressure Iraq was forced to readmit UN inspection teams in November 2002.  
The UN teams were unable to find WMD or production facilities, but the U.S. 
and Britain were resolute to finish the job before the hot season came, so 
they insisted on termination of inspection and use of force at the Security 
Council in February 2003.  As is well known, France and Germany in 
addition to Russia and others opposed, but the coalition forces went on 
anyway on March 20 without a clear-cut UN resolution. 
   On April 11, after only three weeks since the start, President Bush 
announced the collapse of Husain regime and his plan to let an Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) of the Defense 
Department,  headed by a retired army general Jay M. Garner, govern Iraq.  
On May 1 the President announced the end of major combats, but not only 
Husain and other leaders but also most officers and soldiers didn’t surrender 
but simply went into hiding.  The administrative and security organs 
collapsed, but the occupation forces were too few (about 173,000 for an 
estimated Iraqi population of 24 millions) and incapable to fill the void, thus 
allowing the masses to loot public facilities.  Garner was considered 
incompetent and replaced on May 6 by a retired diplomat and Ambassador at 
Large for Counter Terrorism, L. Paul Bremer, III, who started to head the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on May 12. 
 
3-2. Comparison with Japan 
Japan was in rivalry with the U.S. over hegemony in East Asia since the end 
of  World War I, and when war broke out with China in 1937 the U.S. 
imposed economic sanctions on Japan.  When war broke out in Europe in 
1939 and Germany was at first successful, Japan allied with the Axis Powers 
and occupied French Indo-China in July 1941.  The U.S. reacted strongly 
and banned oil exports to Japan, which deprived the latter of its oil supply.  
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The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration intended to enter the war to help 
the democratic camp, and uncompromisingly demanded that Japan 
withdraw from China, which it knew Japan would not accept(5).  The 
militarist and reckless Japanese government was thus provoked to fight 
with the U.S. by grabbing oil and other resources in South-East Asia, hoping 
German victory would force the U.S. to make a compromise.  As is well 
known, Germany was defeated in May 1945, and Japan surrendered in 
August with the Showa Emperor’s radio announcement, after having 
suffered two atomic bombs blasts and having the Soviets attack in spite of 
the Neutrality Pact they had concluded with Japan in 1941. Japan had lost 
more than 2.7 million lives and one quarter of national wealth, having had 
nearly all major cities bombarded and destroyed (Dower, 1999, p.45). 
     Iraq likewise challenged the U.S. hegemony in the Middle East by 
trying to annex Kuwait, resulting in economic and military sanctions 
imposed by the United Nations led by the U.S.  Husain provoked the anger 
of the U.S. by lauding the September 11 attacks, but Iraq also tried to avoid a 
major war with the U.S. by readmitting UN inspection teams.  So, the 
Iraqis didn’t understand why they were attacked, and as the war ended in 
only 40 days, they didn’t suffer so many casualties and loss of wealth as did 
the Japanese.  The Japanese had been exhausted by the long war with 
tremendous blood-letting and felt relieved when it ended, but the Iraqis, 
especially Sunni Arabs led by Husain, didn’t accept defeat and wanted to 
continue resistance.  The Kurds and Shiite Arabs were pleased with the  
demise of Husain regime, but felt humiliated by such a poor performance of 
the Iraqi army, just like that of  Afghanistan’s army. 
 
4. The Aims and Preparations of Occupation 
4-1. Iraq 
In April 2002 the U.S. State Department initiated a “Future of Iraq Project” 
in which not only Iraq specialists inside and outside the department but also 
more than 240 Iraqis (in exile or in the Kurdish region) participated in 
meetings (held in London).  The project produced 13 volume reports on how 
to end Husain regime and how to reform its political, administrative, 
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financial, judicial, economic, health, and educational sectors in Iraq 
afterwards (6).  So, the U.S. should have been prepared for occupation, but 
actually these reports were not used, because of rivalry between the State 
and Defense Departments.  As is well known, while Secretary of State 
Powell was rather reluctant to attack Iraq, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
and Vice-President Cheney were pushing for it in August 2002.  Britain’s 
and Powell’s persuasion led the U.S. to seek for a new UN Security Council 
resolution which would sanction the use of force, and the State Department 
organized a “Democratic Principles Working Group” (DPWG) of Iraqis and 
made it plan a transition government.     
     In the Defense Department, however, Ahmad Chalabi was considered 
an important information source on Iraq.  He emigrated from Iraq in 1958 
and obtained his Ph.D. from Chicago University.  In 1992 he organized the 
afore-mentioned INC in Vienna, and succeeded in recruiting supporters 
among American ruling circles, promising Iraq would be pro-U.S. and 
friendly to Israel after revolution.  Thus, the INC came to receive a huge 
American aid based on  the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act.  The CIA and State 
Department didn’t trust him, but the Defense Department continued to 
listen to his advice and help him (Phillips, chap.7). 
     The DPWG incorporated diverse Iraqis, but Kanan Makiya of the INC 
(author of a book depicting horror of Husain’s rule, “Republic of Fear”) played 
an important role there.  But he was unable to forge consensus among the 
members over Islam as the state religion, de-Ba’thification, federalism, a 
transitional government, etc. (Phillips, chap.8).  Washington therefore gave 
up temporarily forming a transitional government and convened an 
opposition group conference in London in December.  Zalmay Khalilzad, of 
Afghan stock and former envoy of Washington in post-Taliban Afghanistan, 
was sent to the conference to represent the U.S.  Many groups involved in 
the DPWG joined the conference and it managed to agree on forming a 
coordination committee consisting of 65, half of whom to be Shiite, especially 
from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution on Iraq (SCIRI).  
Immediately after collapse of Husain regime the conference issued a 
communique calling for the establishment of a Provisional National 
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Assembly, an Executive Council, and a Transitional Government composed of 
specialists (Phillips, chap.9). 
     In January 2003, President Bush ordered to set up the afore-mentioned 
ORHA, which was to be composed of about 450 officials from various 
departments, headed by Garner, but it indicated victory of the Defense 
Department in a turf war.  Garner himself intended to profit from the 
results of the Future of Iraq Project, but Rumsfeld was opposed and vetoed 
his plan of employing 32 Iraq specialists from the State Department.  The 
man in charge of the ORHA in the Defense Department, Douglas Feith, 
showed a list of some INC members to Garner and asked him to employ them 
(Diamond, pp.29-31).  Thus, the Defense Department meant to disregard 
the results of the State Department’s efforts to mobilize Iraqis and Iraq 
specialists in making transition plans, and tried to make officials without 
knowledge on Arab affairs carry out the INC’s plans. 
 
4-2. Comparison with Japan 
After Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. Government set up, with the 
State Department’s initiative, an Advisory Committee on Post-War  
Planning, and also a Far Eastern Unit in a Special Research Division within 
the State Department, involving Japan specialists from universities, too. In 
1944, as German surrender became imminent, a Committee on Post-War 
Programs was organized in the State Department, which planned to govern 
Japan directly by using authority of the Emperor and Japanese lower 
administrative organs in order to disarm, democratize, and industrially 
weaken Japan.  The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee then adopted 
in June 1945 “SWNCC150,” which laid principles to govern an occupied 
Japan in line with the above committee’s program (Iokibe, 1985, Vol.2, 
chaps.7-8).  However, Harry Truman’s administration which succeeded the 
deceased Roosevelt in April 1945 was reconsidering the principles as it was 
facing difficulties in directly governing Germany. 
     So, in both the Iraq and Japan cases the U.S. made plans for occupation 
beforehand by mobilizing State Department officials and knowledgeable 
outsiders, and aimed at disarming and democratizing the occupied country, 
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although the U.S. didn’t intend to disarm Iraq completely and industrially 
weaken Iraq, as it did with Japan.  In preparation, the State and Defense 
departments cooperated in planning for Japan, while in the Iraq case they 
were engaged in a turf war, and the victorious Defense Department 
disregarded the results of the State Department’s investigations.   
 
5. Occupation Policies and Executive Organs 
5-1. Iraq 
Rumsfeld and Garner of the ORHA seem to have planned to promptly 
appoint an interim Iraqi government, make it adopt a new constitution, and 
let coalition forces withdraw by August (Diamond, pp.135-139; Dodge， 
pp.710-713), which soon turned out to be impractical, as the rampant looting 
destroyed most public facilities.  The ORHA scarcely had any staff who 
spoke Arabic or who were knowledgeable of Arab affairs, and Garner tried to 
hire Iraqi higher officers, but the INC and its followers opposed it.  As was 
mentioned above, Garner was relieved in only three weeks and Bremer 
appointed as head of the CPA.  It was given more power than the ORHA, 
but was still responsible for the Defense Department and shared Iraqi rule 
with the Combined Joint Task Force.  Bremer cancelled the plan of 
appointing an interim Iraqi government, and intended to himself exercise 
administrative, legislative, and judicial powers and oversee adoption of a 
new constitution.  First, he ordered the banning of the Ba’th Party and 
exclusion of its elite members (estimated to be about 20,000) from public jobs, 
and then called for the dissolution of all the defense and security related 
ministries, offices and military formations(7).  He had his staff make a 
Strategic Plan in July and define the ultimate goal of the CPA as “a unified 
and stable, democratic Iraq” with a vibrant economy and a representative 
government (Bremer, p.115).   
     Garner had appointed an Iraqi Leadership Council composed of Kurds 
(Barzani and Talabani), Shiites (al-Hakim and al-Ja’fari), émigrés (Chalabi 
and Allawi), and a Sunni (al-Chaderchi), which Bremer enlarged into an 
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in July.  The 25 member council failed to 
elect a chairperson, and so chose a group of nine who would chair one month 
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each in rotation.  The IGC was allowed to appoint a committee to prepare a 
new constitution and an interim cabinet of 25 specialists in August.  The 
coalition forces had been preparing local elections, but Bremer stopped them 
and made local notables elect local assemblies.  Iraqis were angry at it and 
the American Government as well as public opinion demanded early transfer 
of sovereignty to Iraq, and so Bremer had to announce in September his 
intention of letting Iraqis draft a constitution, approve it with referendum, 
elect a parliament, form a government, to which the CPA would cede power 
and then dissolve itself (Diamond, pp.45-47; Wilcke). 
     The CPA was not promptly staffed because of difficulty in securing 
budget and finding the right persons, but came to be composed of about 3,000 
in July, about one thousand of whom were Americans and the rest from 
coalition countries and Iraq (many of Iraqis were interpreters).  Many 
Americans were young, with only a three month contract and scanty 
knowledge of Iraq, but were positioned to give orders to Iraqis.  Although 
they were good-willed and hard-working (and risk-taking), they were not 
well received by Iraqis and were not very effective(8).  The UN staff 
withdrew from Iraq after its office was bombed in August.  The Iraqi army 
and police were newly organized after vetting former soldiers and policemen, 
but their skill, equipment, and morale were not enough to suppress 
insurgency by themselves.  The administrative offices had their Ba’thist 
elites replaced by returning émigrés and began tackling formidable jobs 
under CPA directives, but these bosses were neither liked by ordinary 
employees nor necessarily competent.   
 
5-2. Comparison with Japan 
Just before General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (SCAP), arrived in Japan at the end of August 1945, the 
Truman administration changed the occupation policy from direct rule to one 
of  indirect rule.  So, SCAP’s (and his General Headquarters, GHQ’s) 
occupation policy principles sanctioned by Washington in early September 
were: ruling through the Japanese Government; freedom of religion and 
speech; basic human rights; dissolution of monopolies; and democratic 
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transformation of the feudalistic and authoritarian system. Allied forces 
(mostly American) occupied Japan throughout, amounting to about 430,000 
by the end of the year, which were not many for the Japanese population of 
about 75 million, but in fact more than enough as the social order was 
maintained by the police and there was no resistance against occupation 
forces.  GHQ was composed of about 6,000 in 1948, of whom 3,850 were 
civilian (Takemae, p.95).  The Army, Navy, and military forces were 
dissolved, and more than 2,000, including about 100 military as well as 
political leaders (excepting the Showa Emperor), were arrested as war 
criminals.  Later, in 1948, the “International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East” sentenced death to 17, and prison terms to 18.  Moreover, in other 
parts of Asia, about 5,700 Japanese (some were ethnic Koreans or 
Taiwanese) were tried by military tribunals and 920 were executed.  Many 
of those tried in the Soviet Union are still unaccounted for (Dower, 1999, 
chap.15).  While not considered criminals, but about 210,000 elites in 
politics, public offices, business, press, and education were purged from 
January 1946 on as having been responsible for militarism and multiple war 
efforts, although some of them were later rehabilitated.  
     So, in both Iraq and Japan the armed forces were dissolved, 
politico-military leaders arrested and tried (though Iraqi leaders are being 
tried not for war crimes but for brutal repression of their own people), many 
social elites purged for the sake of democratization, and political as well as 
economic reforms were pursued by the U.S. and its allies.  However, a 
critical difference is that in Japan the occupational rule was indirect, 
employing the Emperor, government, and police, while in Iraq it was direct, 
as legitimate leaders were lacking, administrative organs in disarray, and 
the police dissolved.  Therefore the social order was maintained and 
governance effective in Japan, while in Iraq the social order collapsed and 
governance is largely ineffective.  The direct rule in Iraq ended only after 13 
months, but a certain indirect rule may be said to continue. 
 
6. Policy Implementation and Results 
6-1. Iraq 
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The first objective of the war and occupation against Iraq for the U.S. was 
removal of WMD and their production facilities, but the UN inspection 
before the war and American searches afterwards have only found traces of 
them.  A recent investigation report tells that Husain regime had destroyed 
them before readmitting the UN inspection teams in 2002, but production of 
WMD was a top secret project and those in charge were used to lying to 
Husain for fear of severe punishments, making nobody including Husain 
himself informed of the true situation (Woods).   
     As for rebuilding the armed forces, the Iraqi Government announced in 
June 2006 that the number in Iraqi security forces reached 265,600: 113,400 
military forces under the Ministry of Defense and 148,200 police and police 
commando forces under the Ministry of Interior (Katzman, tables 4-5).  
However, they are mostly underequipped and poorly trained, and so security 
matters are still administered by the coalition forces, based on the mandate 
given by the U.N. Security Council resolutions (1511 of 2003, 1546 of 2004, 
and 1637 of 2005).  In the Kurdish region, “Peshmerga” militias are working 
as the security organ of the Kurdish regional government, but Shiite ones 
such as “Badr Brigade” and ”Mahdi Army” are not smoothly dissolved and 
absorbed by state security organs. In Sunni areas and Baghdad, insurgent 
groups including foreigners like Al-Qaeda affiliates keep fighting against 
coalition and Iraqi troops, threatening the country with an “ethnic 
cleansing ” civil war(9).  Therefore the coalition forces can’t withdraw any 
time soon, and the U.S. troops remain at about 130,000 in mid-2006, while 
the Spanish and Ukrainians withdrew and the British, Polish, Italians, and 
Koreans have all reduced their troops. 
     As for the aim of democratizing Iraq, the CPA faced strong resentment 
of the Iraqis against the direct rule, and so in October came under direction 
of an Iraqi Stabilization Group of the White House, run by Rice, and after 
consulting with the IGC announced the following month a new plan to 
accelerate the transfer of sovereignty.  That is, a Transition Law would be 
adopted first, and a 15-men Organizing Committee would elect a 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) by May, and then that Assembly 
would appoint an Interim Government (IG) by the end of June, which would 
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take over sovereignty (Diamond, pp.48-52; Phillips, pp.177-183; Bremer, 
chap.8).  However, the most respected Shiite leader, Grand Ayatollah 
al-Sistani opposed election of the TNA by the Organizing Committee as 
undemocratic, so the U.S. had to invite a UN investigation team for 
consulting with Iraqis.  The team, headed by an Algerian Lakhdar Brahimi, 
advised appointment of a care-taker government consisting of specialists, 
which would take over sovereignty in June and conduct general elections of 
the TNA, and then it would adopt a new constitution by August the next year, 
and if it was approved by national referendum, election of the National 
Assembly (NA) should be done by December. The CPA basically agreed, and 
the IGC adopted a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) to that effect in 
March.  The IG was appointed in June, again with Brahimi’s mediation, and 
was comprised of a 3-men Presidium and a Cabinet headed by Ayad Allawi, 
which turned out to be more than a specialists’ care-taker government, 
reflecting ethnic balance and employing many of the IGC members 
(Diamond, chap.9; Bremer, chap.13; EIU, September 2004, pp.14-22).  The 
IG did formally take over sovereignty before the end of June, and a National 
Conference was convened in August gathering more than 1,400 from across 
the country, which elected a 100-member National Council.  But the TNA 
was elected directly with a single national constituency system in January 
2005, although Sunni Arabs largely boycotted the elections.  The results 
were a victory for Shiites with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) obtaining 48% 
of the vote and 140 seats, the Kurdistan Alliance came next with 26% and 75 
seats, followed by the secular Iraqi List with 14% and 40 seats, etc. (Sakai, 
2005, pp.26-32).  The TNA elected or appointed the Transitional 
Government (TG) with President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Ibrahim 
al-Ja’fari in April, and set up a committee to draft the new constitution the 
following month.  The draft constitution was agreed upon in August and 
approved by national referendum in October despite intensified resistance to 
coalition forces and ethnic conflicts, with 78% of the votes supporting it (the 
majority of Sunni Arabs opposed, though). 
The constitution adopts republic and federalism.  The three-men 
Presidium is elected by a two-thirds majority of the NA, which appoints 
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Prime Minister from the largest group in the NA, who chooses other 
ministers.  The 275 members of the NA are elected by proportionate 
representation, but more than 25% of them have to be female.  Freedom, 
democracy, and human rights have to be respected, but Islam is designated 
as an important source of law.  Moreover, Article 2-(a) ordains that “No law 
can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam,” so there is 
possibility that freedom and human rights, especially of women, might be 
restricted, and actually recent rise of Islamism does seem to be curtailing 
women’s rights (Efrati). As for federalism, Iraq consists of a Kurdish region 
and an Arab region, with official languages of Kurdish and Arabic, the 
Kurdish region having an autonomous government, assembly, and army, 
with rights to negotiate with foreign governments.  The Kurds are 
attempting to incorporate the oil-rich Kirkuk area into their region, though 
it was Arabized during the Husain era, and the constitution can be read as 
giving rights to regions to exploit and benefit from new oil wells, although it 
says the profit from existing oil wells has to be shared equally among the 
nation.  Therefore, Sunni Arabs are opposed to federalism and demanding 
revision of the constitution.    
The general elections of the NA were duly conducted in December as 
ordained by the TAL, but insurgent and terrorist activities had intensified 
and candidates couldn’t freely campaign except through media.  However, 
most Sunni Arabs chose to participate in elections this time, as they had 
suffered from insufficient representation in the TNA and constitution 
committee.  The results were again victory for the UIA which obtained 128 
seats, followed by the Kurdistan List (53), the Iraqi Accordance Front (44) 
and the National Dialogue Front (11, both are of Sunni Arabs), the Iraqi 
National List (25, of secular Arabs), etc..  The Presidium was elected soon 
with Talabani again at the top, and the UIA chose to keep Ja’fari as Prime 
Minister, but he was considered too close to Islamists by the other parties 
(and the U.S.), and competition for key posts like Ministers of Defense, 
Petroleum, etc. was so severe, it took as many as five months for the 
government to be appointed. Ja’afari had stepped down, but the new Prime 
Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, is his close ally and 16 other ministers are Shiites, 
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followed by 7 Kurds, 8 Sunni Arabs, and 6 secular Arabs (Ridolfo)(10).   
So, democratization has been almost accomplished in form, but 
economic reconstruction is lagging behind.  The U.S. had presumed that 
Iraq would recover promptly with oil wealth and not demand massive 
American aid.  However, Iraqi production facilities were damaged not only 
by war but also by looting, and insurgency and sabotage have obstructed 
reconstruction. The facilities had been worn out under the pre-war sanction 
regime, and their replacement demands an enormous investment, but 
foreign investment is slow in coming due to poor security conditions.  The 
U.S. managed to make the UN not only abolish the sanction regime but also 
convene an international conference to help Iraq, leading the participants 
including Japan to pledge 13.6 billion dollars in total, and then made the 
Iraqi debtor consortium (France, Russia, Kuwait, among others) forgive 
more than 80% of the debt.  The U.S. itself is devoting massive assistance to 
Iraq, but under the CPA big enterprises from the coalition countries, 
especially the U.S., received orders for reconstruction projects.  The 
worsening of security conditions have either stopped many projects or forced 
them to allocate a big portion of funds for security measures.  Moreover, 
huge sums of ministerial budgets are reportedly embezzled by Iraqi officials, 
and one can’t be optimistic that such harmful traditions would be eradicated 
any time soon (Le Billon; EIU, June 2005, pp.25-26). 
Institutionally, the CPA liberalized government control of trade, 
financial, and economic activities, and gave independence to the central bank 
which started to issue new notes.  It also announced principles of 
privatization of state enterprises, which invited criticism as violating 
international law or incurring an even higher unemployment rate, and so it 
wasn’t carried out (Looney).  However, restoration of the government 
finance which had been started by the CPA has been pursued after its 
departure, as it is demanded by creditors like the U.S., the debtor 
consortium, the IMF and World Bank.  For example, the price of gasoline, 
which had been very cheap and so stimulated smuggling, has been raised in 
spite of popular resentment.  Thus, the governmental deficit which 
amounted to 41% of the GNP in 2004 is estimated to have dropped to 24% in 
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2005 (EIU, September 2005, p.20).  The inflation rate is high: 36% in 2003, 
32% in 2004, and estimated 20% in 2005.  But the real growth rate of the 
GNP rebounded from -- 30% in 2003 to 47% in 2004 and estimated 3% in 
2005(11).  In spite of high oil prices, economic growth has been hampered by 
the worsening security condition since the regaining of sovereignty. 
 
6-2. Comparison with Japan 
SCAP ordered the Japanese Government to carry out five major reforms: 
emancipation of women; promotion of labor unions; liberalization and 
democratization of education; abolishment of secret repressive organs; and 
democratization of economic structure.  A considerable number of “New 
Deal Liberals” who joined GHQ aided Japanese who, having learned hard 
lessons from the disastrous failure of militarist authoritarianism, were eager 
to undertake them.  SCAP then demanded that they adopt a new 
constitution, so the Japanese Government appointed a committee to draft it.  
But the committee was not willing to radically change the existing 
constitution.  So, in February 1946 MacArthur ordered his staff to draft a 
new one, with three principles: (1) The Emperor is at the head of the State; 
(2) War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished; and (3) The feudal 
system of Japan will cease.  The draft was made in only a week (based on a 
SWNCC document which had been sent to SCAP in January), approved by 
him, and secretly handed over to the Government. The Cabinet members 
were told that accepting it was the only way to save the Emperor, and it was 
accepted with minor changes (Dower, 1999, chaps.12-13; Sakamoto & Ward, 
chaps.2 & 4).  In April 1946, Lower House elections were conducted with a 
new election law which gave franchise to not only men but also women of 20 
years old or above, and eligibility for election to those of 25 years old or above.  
2,770 ran for 464 seats, and the Liberal Party won 140, followed by the 
Progressive Party (94), the Socialist Party (92), the Cooperative Party (14), 
the Communist Party (5), other parties (38), and independents (81), with 39 
women.  A coalition government of Liberals and Progressives headed by 
Yoshida Shigeru was formed.  The new constitution was adopted by both 
Houses and came into force the following year, which made the Emperor a 
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“symbol of the state” with no political power, forbade the State to engage in 
war, and established a system of checks and balances between the three 
branches of government.  In the same year, a Local Autonomy Law and a 
new Police Law were adopted and the Ministry of Interior was abolished and 
replaced by Ministries of Local Autonomy and of Construction and the 
National Police Agency.  The new Parliament was elected, and in the more 
important Lower House, Socialists won 143 seats, followed by Liberals (131), 
Democrats (124), Cooperativists (31), Communists (4), and others (33).  A  
coalition government headed by Katayama Tetsu, a Socialist, was formed, 
reflecting discontent of the masses over economic hardships (such a leftist 
government was to be a passing phenomenon).   
     In the economic sphere, the Japanese faced famine in immediate 
post-war months and estimated two thousands died of hunger in Tokyo and 
five other major cities (Dower, 1999, p.93).  Massive food assistance by GHQ 
saved others, but finding jobs for 9 million former soldiers and 3 million 
civilians returning from former colonies (Ibid., pp.48-49) was not helped, as 
the Japanese Government had to provide the massive occupation troops with 
housing and utilities.  So, the first half of 1946 was the worst period which 
saw a lot of protest actions by underpaid workers and the unemployed.  The 
government tried to promote reconstruction through concentration of funds 
to coal-production, while GHQ imposed economic democratization, namely, 
disbanding conglomerates and the landed class.  As for conglomerates, 9 
major holding companies were disbanded by a November 1945 law, and more 
big companies were to be split up by an Anti-Monopoly Law and a law for 
“forbidding over-concentration of economic power” in 1947 (Nakamura, 1979, 
pp.203-221).  But in January 1948 the U.S. occupation policy for Japan was 
radically changed, as it decided to make Japan an ally in East Asia, while 
China was turning into communist and an ally of the Soviet Union, the 
American foe in the rising Cold War rivalry.  So, GHQ stopped pursuing the 
policy to weaken Japanese industries, and the U.S. and Britain renounced 
their rights to demand reparation payments (though South-East Asian 
countries didn’t).  As for the land reform, the first and second Land 
Adjustment Laws of 1946 practically confiscated farm lands above three 
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hectares (excepting Hokkaido area) and distributed them to poor peasants.  
Hyper-inflation was calming down in 1948 as production increased, when 
GHQ imposed a “nine principles for economic stabilization” which gave 
priority to budgetary equilibrium.  In the following year, an American 
economic envoy pushed for de-regulation and deflationary policies, putting a 
brake on economic growth and increasing unemployment.  The resulting 
economic crisis was only overcome by unexpected “special procurements” 
from American troops engaged in the Korean War which broke out in 1950.  
In 1952, Japan at last regained its sovereignty (though with a Security Pact 
with the U.S., which made American military presence in Japan permanent), 
and also regained the level of pre-war economic production. 
     So, the U.S. imposed on both Iraq and Japan similar occupation policies 
of disarmament, democratization, and economic reform (though the Iraqi 
army is being rebuilt), and  the Japanese peacefully accepted them, while 
many Iraqis, especially Sunni Arabs, do not accept occupation and have been 
trying to obstruct democratization and economic reform.  It was easier for 
the Japanese to accept the occupation as the Emperor ordered it himself and 
the Japanese Government carried out occupation policies, but punishment of 
those responsible for the war as well as post-war economic hardships were 
more severe in Japan than Iraq.  It was unfortunate for Iraq not to have 
found a legitimate national leader who could replace Husain immediately, 
and so direct rule had to be adopted, but it had to be abandoned only after 13 
months.  For the succeeding Iraqi governments to pursue such radical 
reforms has been most difficult, as ethnic conflicts over greater portion of 
power and oil wealth have intensified.  Oil wealth seems to be a blessing for 
Iraqis and a curse at the same time. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Now, let me conclude by considering how those differences between Iraq and 
Japan can be explained with Huntington’s above hypotheses. 
When an authoritarian regime collapses, it is essential for a peaceful 
transfer to democracy to have a “popular, charismatic, democratically 
inclined leader.”  Japan may arguably have found such a leader in the 
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Showa Emperor himself(12), while Iraq has found none – Grand Ayatollah 
al-Sistani may be said to be like one among Shiites, but he avoids direct 
involvement in politics.  As for “systemic problems,” both countries faced 
severe problems, but unlike the cases Huntington discusses, these are under 
foreign occupation and so drastic measures could be imposed on vested 
interests.  Transition policies such as the establishment of a legitimate 
government through elections, dealings with authoritarian crimes, the 
military, and vested economic interests, etc. … may be said to be similar:  
former political, military, economic, and social leaders were purged in both 
countries, although some of them were later rehabilitated.  But in Japan, 
many people were punished for war crimes, while in Iraq Husain and a few 
other leaders are being tried by Iraqis themselves (however, many other 
Ba’thists are being assassinated). 
     Huntington says that for a new democratic regime to stabilize, mutual 
cooperation and the devotion of political elites as well as the ability of publics 
to distinguish between the regime and the government or rulers are 
necessary. 
Japan may be said to have had both, but Iraq seems to lack both – 
political elites are split along ethnic or religious lines, and publics blame 
democracy for insecurity, economic hardships, and ethnic conflicts.  Such 
differences can be attributed to many factors according to Huntington. In 
earlier experiences in democracy, levels of industrialization and education, 
and political capabilities of a nation, the Japanese appear to have had higher 
levels than the Iraqis do. The latter suffers from ethnic complexity and 
dependency on the “rentier-state (13).”  As for external environments and 
influences, both countries were occupied by a democratic super-power, the 
U.S., and imposed democratization.  In Japan, some influence of 
communism from neighboring Russia and China was felt, while in Iraq 
considerable influence of Islamism from neighboring Iran is evident, and 
Syrian as well as Turkish interference is suspected.  A consensual, less 
violent transition based on indigenous causes is preferable, but both 
countries had a forceful, violent transition imposed by foreign powers.  
However, the Japanese had attacked first and fought long and hard enough 
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to accept defeat and its consequences with resignation, while the Iraqis do 
not understand why they were attacked and did not fight much, so they can’t 
accept defeat and still try to resist the occupation.  As for the number and 
nature of severe contextual problems, both countries may be said to be 
roughly at the same level, but Japan’s economic hardships were more severe, 
while Iraq suffers from ethnic conflicts.         
Finally, I wish to address a factor that Huntington does not discuss ---- 
namely, occupation.  The U.S. had prepared well for Japan, and executed 
plans during a long period using the Emperor, Japanese police and 
administrative organs skillfully, while with Iraq, it didn’t prepare well (when 
it did, the results were not used), and tried to reform many areas in a short 
time without being much able to use the Iraqi police and administrative 
organs, thus leaving the democratization project only half done.  Half the 
responsibility for the present confusion lies with the Bush administration, 
especially Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, but the other half of course 
belongs to Iraqi political elites who are vying with each other for 
ethnic-sectarian supremacy and oil wealth.  The eventual success in 
stabilizing the democratic regime hinges on their collective will and efforts.  
After all, the Japanese success was due to the collective will of their political 
elites to support democracy, which is clearly shown by the fact that they have 
kept the post-war Constitution intact even after regaining independence. 
 
Notes 
(1) See, George W. Bush, “Iraq is Fully Capable of Living in Freedom,” in Sifry and Cerf, 
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(2) See, e.g., Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986); John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, 
Democracy and Democratization (Sage Publications, 1999) 
(3) Senryo Kaikakuno Kokusai Hikaku (International Comparison of Reforms under 
Occupation) (Tokyo, 1994) edited by Yui Daizaburo et al. studies social reforms under 
occupation in Japan and other cases in Asia and Europe in the wake of World War II, 
but treats them separately and does not present any theoretical framework. 
(4) According to Bremer, more than 90% of the state budget was directly controlled by 
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Husain’s presidency, and the inflation rate was running at 100,000% and unemployment 
50% at the end of 2002.  Bremer, pp.66-67. 
(5) The United States had wanted to postpone the confrontation with Japan as long as 
possible, but German invasion of the Soviet Union changed its policy.  See Waldo H. 
Heinrichs, “’Daidomei’-no Keiseito Taiheiyo-Sensono Kaimaku (The Formation of the 
‘Grand Alliance’ and the Outbreak of the Pacific War)” in Hosoya.  However, I do not 
accept the conspiracy theory that President Roosevelt had known of Japan’s attack on 
Pearl Harbor. 
(6) Phillips, chap.3.  However, it didn’t anticipate American occupation, but presumed 
establishment of a transitional government by basically émigrés and Kurds.  See also, 
Diamond, pp.27-28.  
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(9) Local politics are dominated by particular groups and their militias, and the central 
government cannot control them.  See Rangwala, pp.170-177. 
(10) Later, a Sunni Defense, a Shiite Interior, and a Shiite National Security Ministers were 
added. 
(11) EIU, September 2005, p.12 & ibid., March 2006, pp.28-29.  The GNP per capita for 
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(12) On the first day of 1946 the Showa Emperor declared that he is not a living god, and 
later he was formally deprived of political power and private lands, but the fact that he 
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maintained.  Otherwise, it is impossible to explain why the Japanese military men 
meekly obeyed his order to surrender to the enemy.  
(13) See, e.g., Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State (Routledge Kegan & 
Paul, 1987).  The Iraqi Government expects to depend on oil for at least 90% of revenue 
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